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Airport noise is costly. Airport location is typically associated with lower property prices. 
Airport expansion often sparks protests by local residents. In this paper, I provide new 
evidence on the costs of airport-related noise (and other disamenities of airports) for 
individuals. In contrast to previous work, I analyze voting results on restricting airport 
operations. Using data from a referendum on the closure of one of Berlin’s inner-city airports, 
Tempelhof, I find that voting behavior is not primarily explained by exposure to airport 
disamenities. Rather, strong opposition to closure in the vicinity of Tempelhof indicates that 
adaptive preferences may be important. 
JEL Code: D61, D62, H41, I18, R41. 
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1. Introduction 
On 30 October 2008, the Berlin city government closed all operations on Tempelhof 
airport (IATA code THF), one of the city’s three commercial airports. The closure is part of a 
plan to concentrate all passenger flight activities in the region at a single location, Schönefeld 
airport (SXF), where currently new runways and terminal buildings are being built. When the 
expansion of Schönefeld is completed, the new airport (called “Berlin Brandenburg 
International”) is expected to also replace the city’s current main airport, Berlin-Tegel (TXF). 
The closure of Tempelhof airport was heavily disputed in public. For one thing, the 
airport has a long and rich history. The area has been used as an airfield since 1909 when first 
flight demonstrations were made by, among others, Orville Wright. With the growing 
emergence of air passenger traffic, Tempelhof became officially designated as an airport in 
1923, making it one of the oldest commercial airports in the world. Tempelhof has also been 
temporarily one of the world’s busiest airports. In 1926, the German national airline, 
Lufthansa, was founded in Tempelhof; during the 1930s, the airport handled more than 30 
percent of German air passenger traffic. The importance of Tempelhof for passenger traffic 
declined after the end of World War II. Hub travel (and Lufthansa) relocated to West 
Germany; city-related air traffic increasingly shifted to Tegel which became Berlin’s major 
airport in the mid-1970s. However, despite its decreasing role as flight destination, Tempelhof 
remained of large symbolic value. When, shortly after the division of Berlin among the 
victorious powers, Soviet authorities blocked all water- and land-borne transportation into and 
out of the three western-controlled sectors of Berlin, western allies supplied the population by 
air. Since Tempelhof was central to the Berlin Airlift operation, with more than 275,000 
flights from June 1948 to May 1949, the airport became a forceful symbol for freedom for the 
rest of the cold war period. 
Another reason for opposition to closure is the convenient geographic location of the 
airport. Tempelhof is situated close to the city center; the airport is well integrated into the 
city’s public transport system. While the location in the inner-city area limits the capacity of 
the airport, it appears to offer good opportunities for short-distance flights or business travel. 
In view of these arguments and a controversial public discussion, interest groups 
initiated a city-wide referendum (“Volksbegehren”) on the closure of Tempelhof airport. 
Having a direct vote of the electorate on a specific issue (as well as the necessary 
preconditions for such a referendum) is defined in the constitution of Berlin. However, a 
ballot poll has been used for the first time in the political history of the state of Berlin. The 
referendum was held on 27 April 2008. In total, 881,035 votes were cast, of which the   2
majority (529,880 or 60%) were indeed in favour of keeping the airport open. Still, the 
referendum failed. Since voter turnout was low (about 36%), the votes for the initiative were 
only 21% of the total electorate of about 2.438 million eligible voters, while a quorum of 25% 
had been required. 
Given that the referendum was designed as a simple yes-or-no vote on a single 
question, the closure of Tempelhof airport, the results of the referendum provide a natural 
experiment to analyze the value of intangibles. Any airport location is typically associated 
with benefits and costs. Amenities of airports include, among others, access to flight travel 
and good shopping and employment opportunities. Disamenities include, most notably, 
aircraft noise but also, for instance, the risk of plane crashes. Previous research (as well as 
frequent opposition to airport expansion) suggests that, for locations adjacent to airports, the 
costs outweigh the benefits. For instance, it has been widely documented that land values tend 
to decline as airport noise increases; see Nelson (2004) for a meta-analysis. Van Praag and 
Baarsma (2005) find that life satisfaction is lower for higher values of the respondent’s 
subjective noise perception. 
In this paper, I provide a novel approach to analyze the costs and benefits of airport 
location. The approach deviates from previous work in two important dimensions. First, 
I analyze direct voting behaviour. An individual’s vote provides a summary record on the 
personal net value of airport location, taking into account all (positive and negative) aspects of 
nearby airport operations. For instance, to the extent that lower property prices provide full 
compensation for the disamenities of airport activities, individuals should be indifferent about 
airport closure. Also, in contrast to survey data, voting results represent a (hopefully) 
unbiased view. Second, I analyze evidence from airport closure. Widespread opposition to 
airport expansion may mainly reflect a status quo bias of local residents. Similarly, 
individuals who consider moving closer to the airport and thereby becoming newly exposed to 
airport noise may require some form of compensation for the (ex ante) anticipated 
disamenities. In the case of Tempelhof, in contrast, voters have been already exposed to 
airport operations over a considerable period of time. Voting results on closure may then even 
reflect adaptive preferences, with voters living close to the airport having a preference for 
continued operations, so that the status quo bias works in the opposite direction. 
Previewing the main results, I find that in districts close to Tempelhof airport the 
voter’s support for keeping Tempelhof airport open has been indeed particularly strong. 
Especially voter turnout (i.e., the extent to which voters care about the issue at poll) has been   3
positively associated with airport noise levels. As a result, the costs of noise pollution from 
airport operations appear to be smaller than previous findings suggest. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
existing literature on the costs of airport noise. Section 3 provides some additional 
background on the Tempelhof referendum, followed by a detailed description of the data and 
the empirical methodology. Section 5 contains the key findings of the paper, presenting the 
empirical results. Section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The costs of airport noise are the subject of a large and extensive literature. Building 
on the insights of Pigou (1920) and Coase (1960) on the difference between social and private 
costs, these papers generally aim to quantify the total costs that airport location puts on 
society. However, since the value of intangibles, such as the pleasure of peacefulness and 
quietness, for individuals is often not directly observable, various indirect methods are applied. 
The most prominent approach to price the amenities and disamenities of airports is to 
examine the effects of airport location on the value of relevant market-priced goods, such as 
housing and residential property. These studies typically estimate hedonic price functions in 
which differences in house prices are explained by various structural characteristics (such as 
house size) and locational attributes (e.g., crime rates). Including an additional control 
variable on noise levels then allows quantifying the discount that is associated with noise 
exposure. Standard results suggest that a one decibel increase in airport noise depreciates 
property values by about 0.6%; Nelson (2004) provides a recent meta-analysis of 20 studies 
(and 33 estimates) on North American airports. 
Still, despite its intuitive design, the price-based approach is not without difficulties. 
For one thing, the estimation of hedonic price functions may be flawed. Zoning and other 
forms of regulation may distort prices; also, aiming to control for all kinds of house price 
attributes runs the risk of omitted variable bias. More importantly, it is questionable to what 
extent prices do indeed measure social costs. On the one hand, house prices reflect the 
preferences of the marginal buyer, not society in general. On the other hand, lower house 
prices may provide full compensation for locational disamenities, allowing buyers, for 
instance, to afford larger homes. As a result, spatial sorting of home owners (depending on   4
individual preferences) may ensure that the aggregate net value of intangibles is at least zero 
or perhaps even positive.
1 
An interesting approach to deal with this last issue and to identify the total effect of 
airport location on an individual’s well-being is provided in Van Praag and Baarsma (2005). 
They perform an extensive survey among households living close to Amsterdam’s Schiphol 
airport, asking, among other things, about their personal ‘quality of life’. Interestingly, Van 
Praag and Baarsma (2005) find no association between life satisfaction and measured noise 
levels at the household’s living place, after holding constant for other determinants of 
happiness. It is only when life satisfaction is compared with the respondent’s perceived 
exposure to aircraft noise that a statistically significant negative relationship becomes 
detectable. This finding, however, may suffer from endogeneity. Respondents that have the 
subjective feeling that they are particularly exposed to noise (though, in practice, they are not) 
may also be more dissatisfied with their lives more generally. Another potential problem is 
the small sample size with a questionnaire response rate of only 17%, producing in total 1400 
observations. 
A third approach to quantify the value of intangibles is to ask about the households’ 
willingness to pay for environmental goods (or, alternatively, their willingness to accept 
compensation for a deterioration in their environment). This contingent valuation approach 
has been applied in the context of airport noise in Feitelson, Hurd and Mudge (1996) and 
Carlsson, Lampi and Martinsson (2000), among others. Although perhaps insightful, the main 
shortcoming of such surveys based on hypothetical questions is that respondents have little or 
no incentive to reveal their true valuation. Rather, they are likely to respond strategically; that 
is, they tend to inflate or deflate prices in order to influence the overall result according to 
their preferences. As a result, answers should be assessed with caution. 
The natural experiment that is described and analyzed in this paper allows dealing with 
many of these problems in the existing literature. Direct voting on airport closure provides the 
ultimate feedback on an eligible voters overall assessment of the costs and benefits of airport 
location. Also, the number of respondents is reasonably large. Finally, the risk of strategic 
voting behaviour appears to be limited because the outcome of the referendum could have led 
to real world consequences; although the results of the referendum are de jure non-binding for 
the Berlin city government, it is widely agreed that a majority vote in favour of continued 
                                                 
1 The basic structure of this argument is based on standard land rent models; see, for instance, 
O’Sullivan (2009, part II).   5
operation of Tempelhof airport would have de facto exerted strong pressure on the city 
government to rethink their decision. 
 
3. The 2008 Referendum on Tempelhof Airport 
According to the Berlin constitution, binding bans and rules have to be based on laws 
which must have passed the Berlin parliament (“Abgeordnetenhaus”). Legislative proposals 
for laws typically originate from members of the parliament or the government (“Senat”). 
However, legislative proposals may also be initiated by individuals. More explicitly, under 
Articles 61-63 of the constitution, citizens may file a petition asking for a referendum on 
issues for which the state of Berlin has legal competence; a referendum may aim, for instance, 
to enact, amend or repeal a local law.
2 
The referendum on the closure of Tempelhof airport has been the first ballot poll on a 
specific issue in Berlin. There have been initiatives before, but none of these referendum 
demands has actually led to a poll, mainly because the initiators failed to turn in the minimum 
number of supporting signatures of eligible voters. The “Interest Group City Airport 
Tempelhof”, in contrast, easily met the required minimum of 20,000 supporters; the group 
started its campaign on November 29, 2006 and collected 33,773 signatures by the end of 
March 2007. Also the next hurdle was taken by a wide margin. According to Article 63 of the 
Berlin constitution, for taking a referendum, 7% of the electorate (i.e., 170,385 voters) have to 
express their official support for the initiative by giving a signature in front of a public official 
(at Berlin district townhalls) within four months time. After the end of the signing period from 
October 15, 2007 to February 14, 2008, 204,907 Berlin citizens (~8.4% of the eligible voters) 
had officially asked for a referendum which was finally held on April 27, 2008. 
The broad public support for the referendum probably results from many sources, but 
is perhaps mainly due to the fact that there has been little obvious reason for the closure of 
Tempelhof airport. Tempelhof has a living history, offers a locational advantage as inner-city 
airport, and there is (still) no concept for the future use of this area. So, why is Tempelhof to 
be closed? 
The decision actually reaches back to the early 1990s when, shortly after reunification, 
there was broad agreement among policy-makers that air traffic in the region should be 
concentrated at a single airport. At this time, Berlin and the surrounding state of Brandenburg 
were operating three airports, mainly due to German division, with two of these airports being 
located in the former western part of the city of Berlin. However, especially traffic at these 
                                                 
2 The constitution is available online at http://www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/verfassung (in German).   6
two inner-city airports, Tegel and Tempelhof, was widely viewed as being potentially 
problematic for the future air traffic infrastructure in the reunified region. With the expected 
further increase in air travel, the inner-city location of these airports provided serious limits 
for a future expansion in passenger transport capacity. More importantly, flight operations at 
these airports were associated with elevated noise exposure and heightened risk of disaster for 
inner-city districts. As a result, decision was made to give up the system of airports in the 
region for a single airport, especially since the projected traffic volume for the region is 
properly handled by one large airport. After an extensive review of several possible locations 
for the new airport, accompanied by various forms of protest by local opponents, high-level 
representatives from the state and federal governments (that is, the mayor of Berlin, the 
governor of Brandenburg, and the federal transport minister) decided in 1996 to rebuild and 
expand Schönefeld airport.
3 Not surprisingly, this decision generated an immense number of 
appeals (mostly by nearby residents); more than 4,000 persons took this issue to court. 
Although these appeals were generally unsuccessful, the Federal Administrative Court of 
Germany (“Bundesverwaltungsgericht”) ruled, when deciding some of these cases, that an 
extension of Schönefeld airport without closing the two inner-city airports is not justified.
4 
Based on this ruling, the Berlin city government emphasized, besides environmental aspects, 
legal reasons for their insistence on the closure of Tempelhof; a departure from the original 
plan to close the inner-city airports would risk project (and investment) failure. A third set of 
arguments focuses on economic issues. With the relocation of airlines, air traffic in 
Tempelhof has been in decline; because of low revenues and sizable operating expenditures 
(which are to a large part unrelated to traffic volume), the airport has been losing money for 
years. 
Supporters of Tempelhof airport, in contrast, highlighted the costs of airport closure. 
With no flight operations, jobs and revenue are lost, while there still remain sizable fixed 
costs (e.g., for security and maintenance). In addition, closure would imply destruction of a 
local advantage and the demolition of a city’s landmark. 
In view of these conflicting arguments, voters were asked to decide on the future of 
Tempelhof airport. At the end of March 2008, all eligible voters (i.e., voters eligible to vote in 
elections for the Berlin parliament) received an information brochure about the referendum 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed exposition of the arguments that have led to the decision to expand 
Schönefeld airport, see the state development plan; the plan is available online at 
http://gl.berlin-brandenburg.de/imperia/md/content/bb-
gl/landesentwicklungsplanung/lepfs.pdf (in German). 
4 http://www.bverwg.de/media/archive/3832.pdf (in German).   7
along with their notification. The ballot poll was finally held on April 27, 2008. In the poll, 
voters were confronted with a single yes-or-no question. More specifically, they were asked to 
express their opinion on the following statement: “The inner-city airport Tempelhof provides 
relief and complementary capacity to the commercial airport Berlin-Brandenburg 
International (BBI). The Berlin government is requested to abandon their intention of closure 
immediately and to lift the cancellation of the operating licence. Tempelhof must remain a 
commercial airport! Do you agree with this resolution? Yes/No”. 
Interestingly, political parties took position on this issue and gave clear 
recommendations for voting. The two left-wing parties in government (social democrats and 
former communists), not surprisingly, defended the decision to close Tempelhof airport. Also, 
environmentalists (greens) were in favour of closure. The two main opposition parties 
(christian democrats and liberals), in contrast, heavily criticized the decision of the authorities; 
they were, in fact, strong supporters (and to some extent even initiators) of the campaign to 
keep Tempelhof airport operating. In total, these five political parties accounted for about 
86% of the votes during the last elections for the Berlin parliament (on September 17, 2006). 
The referendum on Tempelhof airport failed. Of the 881,035 votes that were cast, a 
60% majority requested continued flight operations in Tempelhof. However, the number of 
supportive votes (529,880) fell short of the required quorum of 25% of the electorate (which 
would have required 609,509 yes-votes), mainly because of low voter turnout of only about 
36%. As a result, air traffic at Tempelhof airport was suspended, as planned by authorities, on 
October 30, 2008. The official licence expired in mid-December 2008. 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
Individual preferences for airport location may be affected by various motives. A first 
set of motives focuses on intangibles. The most prominent intangible of airport operations is 
aircraft noise; in the vicinity of airports, people are exposed to elevated sound levels which 
may cause negative health effects such as stress, annoyance, hearing impairment and sleep 
disturbance. Other potential disamenities of flight operations include increased pollution, 
greater insecurity because of the higher risk of plane crashes during take-off and landing, and 
extensive airport-related commuter traffic. 
Another set of motives is related to pecuniary economic aspects. For instance, as 
already well documented, residential property prices are often lower in the vicinity of airports. 
As a result, property owners tend to lose from (and therefore typically oppose) airport 
location/expansion, while (noise-resistant) renters of homes may benefit from lower rent   8
levels. Moreover, since airports provide access to (travel) services, customers and suppliers of 
these services have an incentive to locate close to the airport to minimize commuting costs. 
Finally, it has recently been argued that preferences can be adaptive to existing 
institutions; see Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). Therefore, Tempelhof residents (who 
have been exposed to airport noise for years) have perhaps become accustomed to nearby 
flight activities and thereby rather voted for continued operations. 
In the following, I analyze empirically the relative importance of these preferences for 
airport location by examining voting behavior. The referendum on Tempelhof airport 
provides, for the first time, evidence on people’s overall assessment of airports; exploring 
local differences in voting results then allows identifying factors of importance in individual 
cost-benefit analyses of airport location. 
Specifically, I argue that, to the extent airport noise is costly, in districts close to 
Tempelhof airport (or, more precisely, given tightly defined flight corridors for take-off and 
landing, in districts that are particularly exposed to aircraft noise), the preference for closure 
of Tempelhof airport should have been particularly strong. Put differently, noise exposure and 
support for further operation should be negatively correlated (hypothesis #1). Alternatively, if 
local residents are compensated for the disamenities of airport activities (e.g., by lower rents 
or airport amenities), voters are likely to be indifferent about airport closure. There should be 
no measurable association between exposure to airport noise and voting behavior 
(hypothesis #2). Finally, if voting behavior is dominated by adaptive preferences, voters in the 
vicinity of the airport should have been particularly in favor of continued operations. As a 
result, I would expect to find a positive association between a district’s exposure to airport 
noise and the local voters’ support for the initiative to keep Tempelhof airport open 
(hypothesis #3). 
When reviewing the potential determinants of voting behavior on Tempelhof airport in 
detail, three additional considerations appear to be of relevance. First, voting results are 
unlikely to be affected by strategic behaviour of voters for personal purposes. For instance, 
individual pecuniary interests (such as the fear of increases in local rents after airport closure) 
have been probably of minor importance for voting preferences. Given that the future 
development of the airfield in Tempelhof is not yet decided, the impact of airport closure on 
local property prices is unclear.
5 Also, the small scale of regular flight operations at 
                                                 
5 Using a hedonic price model, Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2008) estimate that land values for 
areas exposed to noise pollution of Tempelhof airport sell at a discount of approximately 5-
9% within a distance of 5000 meters along the air corridor. However, this result (as well as 
Ahlfeldt and Maennig’s finding of no land value discount for the much more busy Tegel   9
Tempelhof airport clearly limits the attractiveness of this airport for frequent travellers. In 
2007, seven airlines offered flight services from Tempelhof to 54 destinations in five 
countries (with Brussels and Copenhagen being the main destinations). Tegel airport, in 
contrast, is served by 57 airlines, offering connections to 113 destinations in 41 countries. 
Second, voting behavior on Tempelhof may exhibit a clear east-west pattern. Since 
Tempelhof airport has a strong symbolic value for residents in the western part of the city, 
voters in this part of the city may have a particularly strong preference for ongoing operations 
(despite suffering most strongly from airport disamenities). Differences in voting behavior 
between the former eastern and western parts of the city could then be just another illustration 
of adaptive preferences. Third, voting patterns on Tempelhof may have been affected by 
political preferences. Political parties gave clear recommendations on voting. In fact, the 
referendum campaign on Tempelhof airport has been, at least in part, an initiative by major 
opposition parties to generate a vote of no confidence for the ruling coalition in the Berlin city 
government. As a result, some voters perhaps went to poll for political reasons even though 
they have no position on the referendum issue. 
In practice, voters may have expressed their preferences about Tempelhof airport in 
the referendum in two separate ways. On the one hand, voters may have answered the 
question about flight operations in Tempelhof directly by participating in the ballot poll. On 
the other hand, people may have shown disinterest in this issue by ignoring the poll, thereby 
effectively weakening the campaign to keep Tempelhof open. In the empirical analysis, I use 
the number of valid yes-votes as a share of the eligible population as measure of support for 
Tempelhof airport. 
The referendum on Tempelhof airport has been a secret poll so that individual voting 
behavior is not known. However, voting results are available for a spatially finely 
disaggregated grid of local polling places in Berlin. In total, there have been 1,201 local 
polling places where the referendum was taken; these places (mostly located in public schools) 
covered areas of different geographic size, but were set up for on average about 2,000 eligible 
voters. Figure 1 provides a map of these polling districts along with the percentage of yes-
votes. 
A potential problem is that a sizable fraction of the electorate voted by mail; about 
26% of the votes (230,571) were not taken at polling places but sent by mail so that the 
resident location area of the voter cannot be determined exactly. Fortunately, however, voting 
                                                                                                                                                         
airport) was met with great skepticism by practitioners; see Kurpjuweit and Stollowsky 
(2008).   10
patterns do not differ by the mode of vote taking. Figure 2 graphs the percentage of yes-votes 
for ballot votes and mailed votes by city district; there are 12 city districts in Berlin. With a 
correlation of 0.99, the differences in voting patterns appear negligible. 
In the empirical analysis, I examine differences in voting results on airport closure 
across local polling places. The key explanatory variable of interest is local exposure to 
airport noise from Tempelhof airport. If airport noise (and any other form of flight-related 
disamenities) is of major importance for the location decision of Berlin citizens, residents 
located close to the airport should have a particular interest in closure of Tempelhof; the 
disappearance of local disamenities associated with flight activities would then imply, for 
these residents, a sizable gain (e.g., in their quality-of-living), without any obvious losses. 
In addition, I include a number of other explanatory variables. The benchmark model 
includes, for instance, a binary dummy variable that takes the value of one if the polling place 
is located in the former western part of Berlin; this variable allows capturing the symbolic 
value of the airport (as a symbol for freedom). Measures of political orientation control for 
party preferences. In sum, I run OLS regressions of the form: 
 
 Votei = α + β THFi + γ Xi+ εi , 
 
where Votei is a measure of the referendum outcome at polling place i, THFi is the extent of 
disamenity from Tempelhof airport at i, X is a vector of other control variables, and ε is a 
(hopefully) well-behaved residual. 
Data on voting results by polling place are obtained from the state statistical office of 
Berlin-Brandenburg.
6 The data set contains, for each polling place, information on the number 
of eligible voters, the number of votes cast and the number of yes- (and no-)votes. Based on 
this data, I compute the fraction of the electorate who voted “yes”, the fraction of voters who 
voted “yes” and the fraction of voters in the electorate (i.e., voter turnout) at each polling 
place; these variables measure local preferences for continued airport operations in Tempelhof, 
used as dependent variable in the analysis (Votei). The same source is used for information on 
                                                 
6 I am grateful to Geert Baasen from the bureau of the election supervisor at the state 
statistical office of Berlin-Brandenburg for the provision of the data. Other useful information 
on the Tempelhof referendum (including a copy of the ballot paper) is available online at 
http://www.wahlen-berlin.de/wahlen/framesets/ve-2008.htm.   11
local political preferences; I use the results from elections for the Berlin parliament on 
September 17, 2006.
7 
Local disamenities of Tempelhof airport (THFi) are proxied by airport noise levels. In 
principle, very detailed measures of airport-related noise are available. The Berlin airport 
authority provides, for instance, daily information on the frequency distribution of maximum 
noise levels and the equivalent long-term noise level measured at individual noise 
measurement stations around the airports; there are six of these stations in the case of 
Tempelhof.
8 In practice, however, these detailed statistics are, for my purposes, of little help. 
The number of locations for which flight-related noise levels are available is small. Also, the 
measurement stations are located very closely to the airport so that effectively only a small 
area of the city of Berlin is covered. Most notably, however, the equivalent long-term noise 
levels at the measurement stations do not deviate strongly from measured noise pollution at 
other locations. In fact, it is required by law to officially determine noise protection zones in 
which land use activities are restricted. For Tempelhof, the noise protection zone which 
covers areas exposed to an equivalent long-term sound pressure level of more than 67 dB(A) 
barely exceeds airport territory.
9 
In the implementation, therefore, I begin by determining average noise levels in 
individual polling districts. For this purpose, I use data from the 2008 edition of the Berlin 
Digital Environmental Atlas provided by the Senate Department for Urban Development, 
available online at http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/umwelt/umweltatlas/edinh_07.htm. 
This atlas offers strategic noise maps which cover noise levels in the city of Berlin at a very 
detailed 5×5 meter grid. After having been digitally processed within a standard GIS 
environment, the data are matched with information on the area and location of the polling 
districts; the geographic division of constituencies in the city of Berlin is based on a 
georeferenced GIS map which is taken from the Urban and Environmental Information 
System of the Senate Department for Urban Development and also available online at 
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/geoinformation/index.shtml. More specifically, pixels 
from noise maps are assigned to corresponding polling districts, and a representative (district-
wide) mean of the noise level is computed. In a very conservative approach, then, it is 
                                                 
7 For some polling places, there has been a minor redesign in the geographic area that is 
covered. As a result, the number of polling places with usable data falls to 1,197. 
8 The data are available online at http://www.berlin-
airport.de/EN/GruenerFlughafen/Fluglaerm/Fluglaerm.html. 
9 Stronger restrictions apply to an inner zone with noise exposure to more than 75 dB(A); see 
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/umwelt/umweltatlas/e_text/k706.pdf (in German). 
This zone is located completely on the property of Tempelhof airport.   12
assumed that all measured noise pollution in the immediate vicinity of Tempelhof airport is 
due to flight activities. 
As an alternative measure, I use the plain direct-line distance to Tempelhof airport as a 
proxy for flight-related disamenities. In order to make sure that the estimation results are not 
affected by the exact specification of the distance measure, I experiment with various distance 
measures: distance to airport, circles of varying distance around the airport, and distance to 
the boundary of the noise protection zone around Tempelhof airport. Descriptive statistics for 
the variables used in the empirical analysis are tabulated in the appendix. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the benchmark results. I begin by examining differences in voting 
patterns on Tempelhof airport as measured by the percentage of yes-voters in the total 
electorate; this variable is the most comprehensive measure of referendum outcome, 
combining the two prerequisites for a success of the initiative to keep the airport open: a 
majority of yes-votes in the referendum and a quorum of 25% of the electorate. The main 
variable of interest is the level of disamenities from flight activities at Tempelhof airport. In 
the baseline specification, I use location of a polling district in the noise protection zone of 
Tempelhof airport as a proxy for flight-related noise pollution. The residential population of 
these (two) polling districts is particularly exposed to aircraft noise and, therefore, can be 
expected to benefit most strongly from closure of the airport. As shown in column 1, however, 
the estimated coefficient on this dummy variable is positive and, with a t-statistic of 1.7, 
weakly statistically significant. Taken literally, the coefficient estimate indicates that voters in 
the immediate vicinity of the flight corridors of Tempelhof airport opted, if anything, 
primarily in favor of continued airport operations, by a margin of about 4.5% of the electorate. 
While moderate noise disturbance around Tempelhof airport (e.g., due to limited flight 
activities, departure and landing of only small airplanes, soundproof homes) may be part of 
the explanation, this finding is a strong indication of adaptive preferences. People who have 
been exposed to the amenities and disamenities of nearby airport operations appear to have a 
distinct preference for the status quo. 
In the regressions, I control for a set of other potential determinants of the referendum 
vote by polling place. Most notably, I include a dummy variable for location of the polling 
district in the former eastern part of Berlin. The estimated coefficient on this variable is 
significantly negative, indicating a much greater preference for closure of the inner-city 
airport in areas without any historic relationship to the airport. This finding provides   13
additional support for the hypothesis of adaptive preferences, along the lines of Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). Plausible coefficient estimates are also obtained for political 
preferences. Voting results are strongly correlated with preferences for political parties during 
the last (2006) elections: A larger share of votes for the two right-wing opposition parties in 
the Berlin parliament, christian democrats and liberals, is associated with greater support for 
Tempelhof; a strong position of the former communist party is associated with a larger 
preference for closure. In sum, it is reassuring to note that the estimation model yields strong 
and convincing results. The regression specification fits the data remarkably well, explaining 
about 83% of the variation in the referendum outcome by polling district. 
Next, I gradually extend the area assumed to be affected by flight operations at 
Tempelhof airport. Results are tabulated in columns 2 to 4. In column 2, I consider all polling 
districts located less than 500 meters from the noise protection zone. Specifically, I assume 
that the measured sound pressure levels in these (11) districts are entirely due to flight 
activities. Accordingly, noise pollution in other polling districts is set to be zero. The results 
strongly confirm the baseline estimates. The estimated coefficient on the disamenity measure 
is again positive and, in this specification, also highly significant statistically.
10 Column 3 
uses location of a polling district within a circle of increasing distance to Tempelhof airport as 
a proxy for airport-related disamenities. I consider circles of up to 2 kilometers, 2 to 4 
kilometers, and 4 to 6 kilometers from Tempelhof; polling districts with greater distance to 
Tempelhof airport might already be located closer to another Berlin airport. Again, the 
estimation results forcefully suggest that support for Tempelhof airport has been unusually 
strong in the immediate vicinity of the airport. Similar results are obtained for a measure of 
continuous distance from Tempelhof airport (that also considers differences in voting results 
for polling districts not directly affected by airport operations). As shown in column 4, 
distance is negatively associated with the referendum vote for Tempelhof. 
The last column on the extreme right of Table 1 takes a broader approach and 
examines whether differences in the referendum vote across polling districts are partly 
explained by the mean sound pressure level in a voter’s residential area. Interestingly, the 
estimated coefficient on the noise measure is significantly negative. Hence, the regression 
yields essentially conventional results: Greater noise exposure reduces the support for future 
operation of a potential major source of noise. Interestingly, voters in noisier areas oppose 
                                                 
10 Qualitatively similar results are obtained when noise levels are replaced by a plain binary 
dummy variable (similar to the approach in the baseline specification). Compared with the 
results in column 1, the estimated coefficient falls in magnitude to 2.7, but increases in its 
level of statistical significance. Detailed results are not reported.   14
further flight operations at Tempelhof airport, even though their personal benefit from a 
discontinuation of noise emission from this particular source of noise appears to be negligible 
(and may be even negative due to a relocation of flight activities to other Berlin airports). This 
finding is roughly in line with van Praag and Baarsma’s (2005) observation that it is primarily 
a person’s subjective exposure to noise that matters for the assessment of noise disamenities. 
The estimation result that there is generally a negative association between noise exposure 
and referendum vote further highlights the role of adaptive preferences for voting patterns in 
the vicinity of Tempelhof airport. 
To ensure robustness of the results, I perform extensive sensitivity checks. In a first 
exercise, I experiment with various other measures of referendum outcome as dependent 
variable. In column 1 of Table 2, I explore voting patterns among active voters. This column 
tabulates results for the specification of the baseline model that appears to capture voting 
patterns around Tempelhof airport in the most appropriate way (analogous to column 3 of 
Table 1), when the percentage of yes-votes to the total number of votes cast (instead of the 
maximum number of potential votes) is used as dependent variable. For this modification, the 
estimation results are slightly weaker. The estimated coefficients on the main variables of 
interest, moderate distance of varying degree from Tempelhof airport, fall in magnitude and 
sometimes even lose statistical significance. Still, support for Tempelhof remains, if anything, 
above average in polling districts close to Tempelhof airport, after holding constant for other 
factors. Focusing on active voters strengthens results on political preferences, with negative 
coefficients on the vote share of parties in government (social democrats, former communists) 
and the environmentalists. The adjusted R
2 increases to 0.88. Column 3 shows that greater 
support for the referendum in the vicinity of the airport mainly stems from higher voter 
participation rates. Voter turnout has been higher by up to 5 percentage points in areas close 
to the airport, other things equal. In contrast, judged by voter interest and participation, there 
is little difference in voting behavior between the eastern and western parts of the city.  
The remaining three columns of Table 2 present analogous estimates when referendum 
votes are transformed into binary variables that take the value of one if the requirements for a 
successful referendum are met. In column 4, the dependent variable is one if the number of 
yes-votes in a polling district represents the majority of votes and a quorum of 25% of the 
electorate; there are 250 polling districts in which these conditions are met. The two columns 
on the right of Table 2 report corresponding figures for the two conditions separately.
11 The 
                                                 
11 In polling districts where yes-votes represent at least 25% of the electorate, the majority of 
voters always opted for continued airport operations.   15
main findings remain basically unchanged. Opposition to closure is disproportionately large 
in the surroundings of Tempelhof airport, mainly due to greater voter turnout. 
Table 3 examines the sensitivity of the results with respect to the inclusion of 
additional control variables. I add to the default specification: a) the mean noise level; b) the 
log distance to Tempelhof airport; c) the full set of election results (covering 28 political 
parties and groups); d) the log number of eligible voters; and e) the log area of the polling 
district. The main findings were robust to these perturbations. Voters in the immediate 
vicinity of Tempelhof airport expressed the strongest support for the initiative to keep the 
airport open. 
In sum, there is consistent evidence that voting behavior on the closure of Tempelhof 
airport is not dominated by exposure to disamenities from airport operations. On the contrary, 
voters living in the surroundings of the airport even exhibit a clear pattern in favor of 




Traffic noise is annoying. In this paper, I examine new evidence on the costs of 
airport-related noise (and other disamenities of airports) for individuals. In contrast to 
previous work which mainly focuses on property prices to document the costs of airport noise, 
I analyze voting results from a recent city-wide ballot poll on airport closure; direct voting 
should provide useful insights on the overall assessment of the costs and benefits of an airport 
by residents. Also, respondents participating in this poll have already experienced the 
disamenities of airport operations while earlier evidence seems to reflect mainly expectations 
of annoyance formed ex ante before actual exposure. 
Using data from a referendum on the closure of one of Berlin’s inner-city airports, 
Tempelhof, I find a number of interesting results. First, voting behavior is not primarily 
explained by exposure to airport disamenities. Noise pollution is not the main feature of 
airport operations that necessarily determines individual perceptions about flight activities. 
Second, strong opposition to closure in the vicinity of Tempelhof indicates the existence of 
status quo bias. The dominance of this effect provides another forceful illustration of the role 
of adaptive preferences. Third, this finding is reinforced by the empirical observation of a 
sizable difference in voting patterns between the eastern and the western part of the city. 
Holding other things (such as political preferences) constant, voters in the former West Berlin   16
display a significantly greater preference for continued operations, despite suffering most 
from airport noise pollution. 
In summary, I provide evidence that individual’s may become accustomed with 
disamenities and adjust their preferences accordingly.   17
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   4.477# 
  (2.658) 
    
Noise (<500m from 
THF) 
     0.046* 
  (0.020) 
   
0-2km from THF         2.525** 
  (0.891) 
  
2-4km from THF         1.926** 
  (0.451) 
  
4-6km from THF         0.795* 
  (0.335) 
  
Distance from THF         -1.236** 
  (0.226) 
 
Noise          -0.114** 
  (0.021) 
East    -1.825** 
  (0.420) 
  -1.776** 
  (0.421) 
  -1.316** 
  (0.431) 
  -1.417** 
  (0.423) 
  -1.892** 
  (0.415) 
SPD     2.451 
  (4.159) 
   2.692 
  (4.157) 
   5.561 
  (4.278) 
   2.020 
  (4.106) 
   4.843 
  (4.140) 
CDU   57.950** 
  (3.900) 
 58.241** 
  (3.901) 
 60.243** 
  (3.954) 
 59.083** 
  (3.860) 
 55.176** 
  (3.878) 
Linke    -9.686** 
  (3.575) 
  -9.450** 
  (3.574) 
  -7.620* 
  (3.627) 
  -9.777** 
  (3.532) 
-10.707** 
  (3.536) 
FDP   29.837** 
  (5.461) 
 30.208** 
  (5.460) 
 37.196** 




  (5.403) 
Grüne     3.595 
  (2.808) 
   3.807 
  (2.808) 
   3.231 
  (2.829) 
   0.791 
  (2.814) 
   1.752 
  (2.791) 
       
Adj. R2  0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable: Percentage share of yes-votes in electorate. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. The number of observations is 1,197.   19















votes = yes 
& yes-votes 
≥ 25% of 
electorate 
Majority of 




0-2km from THF     0.908 
  (1.723) 
   4.941** 
  (1.118) 
   1.588# 
  (0.915) 
   0.653 
  (0.982) 
   1.588# 
  (0.915) 
2-4km from THF     1.715* 
  (0.872) 
   2.881** 
  (0.566) 
   1.654** 
  (0.429) 
  -0.409 
  (0.630) 
   1.654** 
  (0.429) 
4-6km from THF     0.288 
  (0.647) 
   1.269** 
  (0.420) 
   0.877** 
  (0.331) 
  -0.842 
  (0.535) 
   0.877** 
  (0.331) 
East    -5.871** 
  (0.834) 
   0.500 
  (0.541) 
   0.464 
  (0.504) 
  -1.772** 
  (0.642) 
   0.464 
  (0.504) 
SPD    -5.952 
  (8.274) 
 29.558** 
  (5.369) 
  -3.208 
  (5.087) 
   6.956 
  (6.125) 
  -3.208 
  (5.087) 
CDU   22.634** 
  (7.646) 
 88.765** 
  (4.962) 
 32.942** 
  (4.527) 
 10.144# 
  (6.099) 
 32.942** 
  (4.527) 
Linke  -124.365** 
    (7.015) 
 37.286** 
  (4.552) 
   5.127 
  (4.968) 
-28.915** 
  (5.884) 
   5.127 
  (4.968) 
FDP   26.704** 
(10.967) 
 47.642** 
  (7.116) 
 20.539** 




  (5.870) 
Grüne  -91.122** 
  (5.472) 
48.637** 
  (3.551) 
   2.454 
  (3.185) 
-18.527** 
  (4.823) 
   2.454 
  (3.185) 
       
Estimation method  OLS OLS Logit  Logit  Logit 
Adj. R2  0.88 0.64      
Pseudo R2    0.56  0.82  0.56 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively. The number of observations is 1,197. 
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Table 3: Additional controls 
 
 
0-2km from THF     2.357** 
  (0.882) 
   0.660 
  (1.168) 
   2.680** 
  (0.878) 
   2.624** 
  (0.889) 
   2.516** 
  (0.896) 
2-4km from THF     1.739** 
  (0.448) 
   0.809 
  (0.639) 
   2.389** 
  (0.464) 
   1.971** 
  (0.450) 
   1.922** 
  (0.453) 
4-6km from THF     0.825* 
  (0.331) 
   0.156 
  (0.423) 
   0.800* 
  (0.333) 
   0.847* 
  (0.334) 
   0.797* 
  (0.335) 
Noise    -0.107** 
  (0.021) 
    
Distance from THF      -0.939* 
  (0.381) 
   
Electorate         -0.665** 
  (0.239) 
 
Area            0.011 
  (0.120) 
East    -1.382** 
  (0.427) 
  -1.324** 
  (0.430) 
  -1.615** 
  (0.442) 
  -1.337** 
  (0.430) 
  -1.324** 
  (0.439) 
SPD     7.661# 
  (4.254) 
   3.686 
  (4.337) 
 177.535 
(131.172) 
   4.539 
  (4.282) 
   5.576 
  (4.283) 
CDU   57.607** 
  (3.946) 
 59.875** 




  (3.945) 
 60.187** 
  (4.003) 
Linke    -8.705* 
  (3.595) 
  -8.731* 
  (3.647) 
 165.768 
(131.210) 
  -7.516* 
  (3.617) 
  -7.650* 
  (3.643) 
FDP   37.742** 
  (5.612) 
 35.439** 







Grüne     1.578 
  (2.819) 
   1.487 
  (2.911) 
 179.380 
(131.081) 
   2.899 
  (2.824) 
   3.236 
  (2.831) 
23 other parties  No No Yes  No No 
       
Adj. R2  0.84 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable: Percentage share of yes-votes in electorate. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. The number of observations is 1,197.   21




Notes: The map shows the areas of polling places, the noise corridors of Berlin airports, and a 
rough classification of referendum results. Groups have been defined according to the “natural 
break method” by Jenks (1977); this method identifies breaks in the ordered distribution of 
values that minimize the within-class sum of squared differences.   22




























Notes: The figure shows the percentage of yes-votes by mode of vote taking for the 12 Berlin 
city districts. 
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Appendix: Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 




of yes-votes in 
electorate 
Number of yes votes as a 
fraction of all eligible voters 
16.5 9.03 2.88 44.94 
Percentage share 
of yes-votes in 
total votes 
Number of yes votes as a 
fraction of all votes cast 
56.82 20.45 15.84 94.33 
Percentage rate of 
voter 
participation 
Number of voters as a 
fraction of all eligible voters 
27.44 7.78  7.26  48.42 
Majority of votes 
= yes & yes-votes 
≥ 25% of 
electorate 
= 1 if number of yes votes is 
>50% of all votes and ≥25% 
of all eligible voters, = 0 
otherwise 
0.21 0.41 0  1 
Majority of votes 
= yes 
= 1 if number of yes votes is 
>50% of all votes, = 0 
otherwise 
0-59 0.49 0  1 
Yes-votes ≥ 25% 
of electorate 
= 1 if number of yes votes is 
≥25% of all eligible voters, = 
0 otherwise 
0.21 0.41 0  1 
Noise Protection 
Zone 
= 1 if district located in noise 
protection zone of THF 
airport, = 0 otherwise 
0.009 0.095 0  1 
Noise (<500m 
from THF) 
= average noise level in 
dB(A) if district located less 
than 500 meters from THF 
airport, = 0 otherwise 
0.09 2.11 0  51.89 
0-2km from THF  = 1 if district located less 
than 2 kilometers from THF 
airport, = 0 otherwise 
0.016 0.125 0  1 
2-4km from THF  = 1 if district located more 
than 2 but less than 4 
kilometers from THF airport, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.086 0.281 0  1 
4-6km from THF  = 1 if district located more 
than 5 but less than 6 
kilometers from THF airport, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.125 0.331 0  1 
Distance from 
THF 
Distance from Tempelhof 
airport in meters 
9728 4630 749  22272 
Noise  Average noise level in dB(A)  57.3  5.4  30.9  72.6 
East  = 1 if district located in 
former East Berlin, = 0 
otherwise 
0.423 0.494 0  1 
Electorate  Number of eligible voters  2033  854  243  5451 
Area  Surface area in square meters  740231  157863
2 
31566  24718399   24
SPD  Share of votes for SPD 
(social democrats) in 2006 
election 
0.319 0.043 0.163 0.484 
CDU  Share of votes for CDU 
(christian democrats) in 2006 
election 
0.202 0.101 0.027 0.481 
Linke  Share of votes for Linke 
(former communists) in 2006 
election 
0.128 0.118 0.007 0.482 
FDP  Share of votes for FDP 
(liberals) in 2006 election 
0.073 0.035 0.013 0.238 
Grüne  Share of votes for Grüne 
(environmentalists) in 2006 
election 
0.131 0.090 0.009 0.475 
 
Notes: Number of observations = 1197. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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